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The history of the production of cultural property in the United States 
follows the same pattern as the history of the racial divide that inaugurated 
the founding of the Republic.  The original U.S. Constitution excluded both 
black women and men from the blessings of liberty.  Meanwhile, that same 
Constitution granted rights to authors and inventors in what is known as the 
Patent/Copyright Clause of Article I, Section 8.1  This clause laid the 
foundation for intellectual property (“IP”) rights that have become an 
economic juggernaut not only in the United States, but globally.2  IP rights 
are inextricably tied to cultural and scientific production, which influences 
all aspects of society.  Thus, before the passage of the major civil rights 
amendments and acts, the provisions of Article I, Section 8 were 
unavailable to protect the cultural rights of early black Americans.  
                                                          
 * Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego CA, J.D. Yale 
Law School. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (announcing that Congress has the power to promote the 
progress of science and the arts by securing, for a limited time, the rights to artistic 
works and discoveries as the property of the artist). 
 2. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Balancing Act: Reflections on Justice O’Connor’s 
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 44 HOUST. L. REV. 965, 975 (2007) (noting that 
the expansion of intellectual property in the United States has helped to “underwrite 
U.S. dominance in the intellectual property sector of the global economy”). 
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Congress enacted laws mandating racial equality and effectively protecting 
the intellectual property rights of blacks in the arts and sciences only within 
the past few decades.3 
This Article briefly explores how women artists, particularly black 
women, have been impacted by the IP system, and compares how both 
blacks and women have a shared commonality of treatment with 
indigenous peoples and their creative works.  The treatment of blacks, 
women, and indigenous peoples in the IP system reflects the unfortunate 
narrative of exploitation, devaluation, and promotion of derogatory 
stereotypes that helped fuel oppression in the United States, and in the case 
of indigenous peoples, both here and abroad.  The treatment of women 
blues artists in the IP system illustrates the racial and gendered nature of IP 
rights, and that IP has been central to racial subordination from both an 
economic and cultural standpoint.  However, examining inequality in the IP 
context is not merely a backwards-looking narrative.  Racial and gender 
dynamics offer unique insights that can guide reforms to the IP system with 
a view toward benefiting, in Derrick Bell’s words, the least-advantaged 
“faces at the bottom” of our society.4 
Traditionally, IP scholarship and jurisprudence has not focused on race 
and gender inequality.  However, these issues are receiving renewed 
attention in feminist scholarship and in critiques of existing power 
structures by those concerned with the treatment of people of color, 
women, and indigenous peoples in the international arena.  Analytical 
inquiries that explore the rights of minorities, women, and indigenous 
peoples enhance the debate about IP reforms.  Further, a focus on the least 
advantaged segments of society, such as blues women, shifts the debate to 
focus on the empowerment of artists who create, and not on empowerment 
of large conglomerates that control IP in the United States and abroad. 
Part I of this Article, briefly discusses the tenets of critical race theory to 
show that it can be useful in explaining how IP law has disadvantaged 
African-American artists and fostered their subordination.  Part II explores 
how feminist critiques of IP benefit from examining the treatment of black 
women, using blues women of the 1920s as a focal point.  Part III examines 
how the treatment of indigenous peoples parallels IP deprivations of blacks 
and women. 
                                                          
 3. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and Its Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 981-82 (2005) (outlining the major civil 
rights statutes passed by Congress throughout the mid- to late 1960s in the aftermath of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including laws bringing racial equality to public 
accommodations, employment discrimination, and housing discrimination). 
 4. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 3 (Basic Books 1992) (arguing that black Americans remain a disadvantaged 
class, and any advances made in the 1960s and 1970s have been reversed in all basic 
measures of poverty, unemployment, and income). 
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF RACE IN LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Many legal scholars increasingly recognize that the examination of race 
in legal discourse serves to illuminate the merits and values of the law.5  In 
contrast, before the 1980s, legal scholarship “virtually ignored legal 
theorizing based on the perspectives of people of color.”6  The invisibility 
of race in legal discourse changed with the advent of critical race theory 
(“CRT”) in the late 1980s, following the development of feminist legal 
theory in the prior decade. 
Critical race theory is not a unified construct, but it does set forth four 
core tenets.7  First, it posits that “race and racism are endemic to the 
American normative order.”8  Second, it posits that legal structures are 
“part of the social fabric . . . [which] constructs and produces race and race 
relations . . . [in support of] white supremacy.”9  Third, it contends that the 
construct of “colorblindness” in legal jurisprudence “ignores and cements 
the racial caste system constructed in part by law,” and thus perpetuates 
inequality for subordinated groups.10  Finally, CRT proponents advocate 
that “[legal scholars should be] working toward a norm of ‘racial equality’ 
where different groups will not continue to suffer the oppression and 
subordination they have suffered.”11 
CRT can also be defined via its opposition to 
at least three entrenched, mainstream beliefs about racial justice . . . 
[one,] that blindness to race will eliminate racism . . . [two,] that racism 
is a matter of individuals, not systems . . . [and three,] that one can fight 
racism without . . . attention to sexism, homophobia, economic 
exploitation, and other forms of injustice and oppression.12 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Marzrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race, 2 J.L. 
& POL’Y 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that law should be integrated into all courses of a legal 
curriculum because of the integral role that race had in the development, 
administration, and consequences of the law). 
 6. Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., Race and Gender in the Law Review, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 27, 56 (2006). 
 7. Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical 
Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 333-34 (2006). 
 8. Id. at 333. 
 9. Id. at 334. 
 10. Id.; see also Neil A. Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’ 
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257 
(1995) (theorizing, in a seminal work on CRT, that the “colorblind” paradigm of 
constitutional law “fosters white racial domination” by maintaining the privileges held 
by whites). 
 11. Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing Within Critical Race 
Theory: An Exercise in Transformative Thought, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 21, 25 (2005). 
 12. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical 
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1766-67 (2003); Francisco Valdes et al., Battles 
Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at the Turn of the Millennium, in  
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et 
3
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Further, CRT advocates reject the use of “neutral” accounts of legal 
decision-making and focus on the perspectives of subordinated peoples, 
i.e., “voices from the bottom” of society.13  Finally, CRT embraces the use 
of story-telling “to expose discrimination and illuminate how the law often 
fails to account for the voices of outsiders.”14 
CRT analysis has been applied to many diverse areas of law, including 
antidiscrimination law, law and economics, and taxation.15  CRT has 
spawned numerous theories of subordination within the law, including 
Latina and Latino Critical Theory, Asian-American critical legal theory, 
and Critical Race Feminism.16  Not surprisingly, CRT and its analogs have 
come under harsh attack from conservatives in the legal academy.17  This is 
expected since “conservative critics have long denounced feminism, as 
well as other civil rights movements, for promoting victimization.”18  
Given the breadth of its subject matter, it is unsurprising that divisions over 
analytical approaches exist in the CRT movement.19 
A. Intellectual Property, Innovation, and African-Americans 
CRT analysis has “provided important insights into the ways in which 
anti-discrimination law has not only failed to address, but [has] further 
entrenched, ideological and thus material forms of discrimination.”20  An 
                                                          
al. eds., 2002). 
 13. See Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 60-61. 
 14. See Mario L. Barnes, Race, Sex, and Working Identities: Black Women’s 
Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of Narrative, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 941, 953-54 (2006) (arguing that many CRT theorists believe that a narrative is an 
important form in which to construct analysis because traditional legal scholarship uses 
the same narrative form to perpetuate racist norms); see also Pedro A. Malavet, 
Literature and the Arts as Antisubordination Praxis: A Latcrit Theory and Cultural 
Production: The Confessions of an Accidental Crit, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1293, 1301-
02 (2000) (examining the use of narrative to combat an essentialism that threatens to 
exclude minority viewpoints). 
 15. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class and Gender Essentialism in Tax 
Literature: The Joint Tax Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1489-90 (1997) 
(discussing the need to examine tax law from a race as well as a gender perspective).  
See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2004) (examining the outgrowth of CRT into business 
related areas of law such as tax, corporate law, and bankruptcy). 
 16. See Mutua, supra note 7, at 337-38. 
 17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 382-84 (3d ed. 1996) (1995) 
(engaging in a scathing critique of critical race and feminist methodology, and 
highlighting the “pathologies” of black anti-Semitism and black criminality that critical 
race scholars purportedly gloss over). 
 18. Martha T. McCluskey, Fear of Feminism: Media Stories of Feminist Victims 
and Victims of Feminism on College Campuses, in FEMINISM, MEDIA & THE LAW 57 
(Martha A. Fineman & Martha T. McCluskey eds., 1997). 
 19. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: “A Critical 
Examination of Recent Writing About Race,” 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004). 
 20. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination 
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insight that CRT offers to IP law is that its use in society and legal 
scholarship, like antidiscrimination law, also may have served to entrench 
material forms of discrimination.  While individual black artists without 
question have benefited from the IP system, the economic effects of IP 
deprivation on the black community have been devastating.  Intellectual 
property today is perhaps the preeminent business asset.21  Analysts 
recognize that blacks and other minorities in a market economy “cannot 
participate as equals unless they too can deploy the private power generated 
by ownership and control substantial business assets.”22 
The three core protections of intellectual property at the federal level are 
copyright, patent, and trademark law.23  Copyright law protects creative 
output of authors, such as music composers, writers, and choreographers, 
by granting limited property rights in their creations.  Patent law provides 
legal protection to inventors of useful inventions.  Trademark law prohibits 
the use of a valid trademark by third parties where the unauthorized use is 
likely to cause consumer confusion in the marketplace. 
In the past, few legal scholars examined race or gender in the context of 
IP.  It is only in recent years that scholarship exploring IP has examined it 
in the context of social and historical inequality.  Only recently have 
scholars, such as Professor Sunder, recognized that IP serves not merely as 
a legal doctrine allocating rights, but “as a legal vehicle for facilitating (or 
thwarting) recognition of diverse contributors to social discourse.”24  IP 
scholars such as Keith Aoki and Shubha Ghosh are now validating the 
phenomena of the similar divestment of patent protection for black 
inventors.25  My scholarship was among the first to show how the structure 
of copyright law, and the phenomena of racial segregation and 
discrimination, impacted the cultural production of African-Americans, and 
                                                          
Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 
455, 464 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., David Kohler, Symposium, Foreword to Sony v. Universal: The 
Betamax Decision Twenty Years Hence, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 151, 151 (2004) (remarking 
that “technology and entertainment represent two of this country’s premier growth 
industries,” and that these industries are founded on control over intellectual property). 
 22. See Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial 
Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 283 (2005) (contending that the wealth deriving 
from “a thriving private sector and business class . . . would ameliorate many of the 
persistent economic disparities” facing blacks). 
 23. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property 
Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERK. TECH. L.J. 733, 735 (2007). 
 24. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 269 (2006). 
 25. See Keith Aoki, Distributive Justice and Intellectual Property: Distributive and 
Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, 
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 738-47 (2007) (noting that 
slave owners often took credit for inventions by slaves).  See generally Shubha Ghosh, 
Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73 (2004). 
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how the racially neutral construct of IP has adversely impacted African-
American artists.26 
The long omission of an analysis of race in the IP context is glaring 
given the tremendous innovative contributions of black authors and 
inventors to society, and the salience of race “branding” in trademark law.  
The treatment of blacks in the IP system has been characterized by two 
dynamics that have import for racial and distributive justice.  First, black 
authors and inventors have found their works routinely appropriated and 
divested.  Second, appropriated and distorted creative works protected by 
copyright, and trade symbols and imagery protected by trademark, have 
promoted derogatory racial stereotypes that facilitate racial subordination. 
B. Blacks and Copyright Law 
At its core, IP in America “is understood almost exclusively as being 
about incentives.”27  The history of blacks in the arts is one of unparalleled 
innovation and creativity, especially in the realm of music and dance.  
There has always been “an overwhelming prevalence of black innovators in 
jazz,”28 as well as blues, ragtime, rock-and-roll, and today’s hip-hop music.  
The history of black artists within U.S. IP law, however, has been one of 
appropriation, degradation, and devaluation beginning with the creation of 
the nation until the 1950s and ’60s.  In the arena of music, there is no need 
to assume mass appropriation and disparate treatment of black composers 
and performers.  Time after time, foundational artists who developed 
ragtime, blues, and jazz found their copyrights divested, and through 
inequitable contracts, their earnings pilfered.29  I argued elsewhere that for 
a long period of U.S. history, the work of black blues artists was essentially 
dedicated to the public domain.30  The public domain “can most broadly be 
                                                          
 26. See generally K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture and Black Music: A Legacy of 
Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339 (1999) [hereinafter Greene, 
Copyright]; K.J. Greene, What the Treatment of Black Artists Can Teach About 
Copyright Law, in PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 385 (2007). 
 27. See Sunder, supra note 24, at 257; see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12 (2d ed. 2000) (noting 
the primacy of incentive theory as underlying the basis of IP protections). 
 28. See FRANK KOFSKY, BLACK NATIONALISM AND THE REVOLUTION IN MUSIC 19 
(1970) (contending that there have been more black innovators in the history of jazz on 
any two instruments “than there have been whites on all instruments put together”). 
 29. The list of such artists is too long to constitute mere “anecdotal” evidence, and 
includes artists from Scott Joplin to Huddie Lebetter to Jelly Roll Morton.  See TERRY 
WALDO, THIS IS RAGTIME (1976); CHARLES WOLFE & KIP LORNELL, THE LIFE AND 
LEGEND OF LEADBELLY (1992); HOWARD REICH & WILLIAM GAINES, JELLY’S BLUES: 
THE LIFE, MUSIC AND REDEMPTION OF JELLY ROLL MORTON (2003).  See generally K.J. 
Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production and the Debate Over African-
American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008). 
 30. See Greene, Copyright, supra note 26, at 356 (arguing that blacks received less 
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defined as ‘material that is unprotected by intellectual property rights, 
either as a whole or in a particular context, and is thus “free” for all to 
use.’”31 
Similarly, it has been argued that with respect to black artists “copyright 
law . . . was created without deference to the interests of large segments of 
society,” including women and minorities.32  Indeed, my previous work 
demonstrates that five copyright structures disadvantaged black cultural 
production. 
First, the idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law prohibits copyright 
protection for raw ideas, and protects only expression of ideas.  I contend 
that this standard provided less protection to innovative black composers, 
whose ground-breaking work was imitated so widely that it became the 
“idea” and thus impossible to protect. 
Second, copyright’s fixation standard provides that copyright protection 
extends only to a work that is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression.33  
However, a key component of black cultural production is improvisation.  
As a result, fixation deeply disadvantages African-American modes of 
cultural production, which are derived from an oral tradition and communal 
standards.34 
Third, copyright law sets forth a minimal standard of originality, which 
does not protect innovation, and in fact encourages imitation.  Fourth, 
copyright formalities, until 1976, put copyright protection out of reach of 
the illiterate or semi-literate creators of the blues.35  Finally, there is a 
                                                          
protections over IP rights due to “inequalities of bargaining power, the clash between 
the structural elements of copyright law and the oral predicate of black culture, and 
broad and pervasive social discrimination). 
 31. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 49 (2004). 
 32. See Greene, Copyright, supra note 26, at 356. 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007) (stating the categories of works that qualify for 
copyright protection, including literary works, musical works, and accompanying 
words, sound recordings, etc.). 
 34. See id. (articulating that copyright protection does not extend to ideas or other 
types of intangible innovations, regardless of the form in which they are described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in a work); see also KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING 
CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71 (2001) 
(contending that “African-American culture comes out of a primarily oral culture . . . 
[and] intertextual practices that characterize many aspects of African-American cultural 
production conflict” with intellectual property law); SIVA VYAIDNATHAN, COPYRIGHT 
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS 
CREATIVITY (2001) (arguing that, although ownership in the blues tradition differs 
significantly from the European model, there is a real and significant claim to 
originality in the performance-oriented world of the blues). 
 35. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS 
L.J. 433, 471 (2007) (explaining that, prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, failure to 
comply with copyright formalities of registration, affixation of notice of copyright, and 
deposit resulted in forfeiture of copyright). 
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general absence of moral rights protection, which protects against harms to 
authorial dignity.  The fact that black artists continued to create and 
innovate, even in the face of diminished economic incentives, poses a 
challenge to copyright policy, which dictates that copyright “is 
fundamentally about providing a balance of incentives for authors.”36  This 
phenomenon surely gives weight to the notion that economic incentives 
alone are not the sole motivator of creative output. 
Larry Lessig, a leading IP scholar, asserted that the “record industry was 
born of . . . piracy.”37  Lessig contends that the “law governing recordings 
gives artists less . . . by giving artists a weaker right than it otherwise gives 
creative authors.”38  Lessig was referring to the compulsory license 
provision of the 1909 Copyright Act, which permits anyone to re-record a 
composition that has been released to the public via sound recording.39 
However, beneath Professor Lessig’s analysis lies a much more insidious 
form of piracy.  The early music industry was built on the back of black 
cultural production from the era of slave songs and spirituals to the period 
of black-face minstrelsy—America’s most popular and profitable form of 
entertainment from 1800 to the end of the last century.40  Minstrelsy “was 
the first truly American contribution to the history of stage entertainment, 
and it owed its very existence to the Negro [sic].”41  Minstrelsy defamed 
blacks, and other minorities, in stereotypical and derogatory ways.42 
Then came ragtime and blues, which single-handedly carried the 
                                                          
 36. See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 228 
(2004). 
 37. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 55 (2004) 
(contending that even the advent of the first recording technology presented new 
problems in law surrounding composers’ rights to their creations, and the music 
industry’s right to reproduce them). 
 38. See id. at 57 (asserting that Congress’s motivation for giving writers and other 
artists more control over their creations than any musician over their songs is the fear 
of stifling creativity and the desire to give the public access to a wider range of music). 
 39. See id. at 57-58 (noting that, while the public and the recording companies 
benefit from limitations on musical rights, the musicians themselves lose). 
 40. See WALDO, supra note 29, at 12 (noting that stereotypical images of the 
“happy-go-lucky, wide-grinnin’, chicken-stealin’, razor-toting darky” became deeply 
embedded in the social conscience of white America during the minstrel period).  The 
minstrel show was central to American culture from the 1830s to the 1870s, so much so 
that it is “difficult for us now to realize how all-pervasive and influential the minstrel 
show was.”  Id. 
 41. See JAMES HASKINS, BLACK MUSIC IN AMERICA: A HISTORY THROUGH ITS 
PEOPLE 21 (1987). 
 42. See Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” and Asian American Identities: Yellowface, 
World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1996) (analyzing how minstrelsy defamed Asian Americans and 
noting that the prevalence of white actors in Yellowface helped to reinforce the 
segregation of Chinese immigrants). 
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recording industry from the 1920s until the Great Depression.  Although 
ragtime music was innovated by black composers such as Scott Joplin, and 
served as “the most popular ‘pop’ style [for twenty years],” it was white 
composers such as Irving Berlin who reaped the greatest financial 
rewards.43  The line between permissible “borrowing” and impermissible 
appropriation may be dim at times, but there is strong evidence that the 
works of black artists were plagiarized and appropriated extensively.44  
Furthermore, the routine stereotyping that occurred concurrently with 
copyright appropriation negatively impacted black artists’ personality 
rights.  It has been said that the creative process “implicates the honor, 
dignity, and artistic spirit of the author in a fundamentally personal way.”45  
From this perspective, black artists also were subject to deprivation of the 
moral rights of integrity and attribution. 
With some irony, one of the most successful white bands of the early 
twentieth century, the Original Dixieland Jazz Band, took New Orleans 
Negro music and reduced it to a “simplified formula . . . the kind of 
compressed, rigid format that could appeal to a mass audience.”46  This 
cultural appropriation of black art set a long-standing pattern wherein 
“large financial gains were made by white musicians playing black music 
to essentially white audiences.”47 
Similar patterns of innovation by blacks, followed by imitation by 
whites, preceded rock-and-roll, a derivation of the blues, and on to today’s 
hip-hop, where white rappers such as Vanilla Ice and more recently 
Eminem gross top sales.48  It has been said that the “exploitation of the 
                                                          
 43. See NELSON GEORGE, THE DEATH OF RHYTHM AND BLUES 8 (1988). 
 44. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, 
Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 305-09 (2006) (exploring the 
lines between borrowing and appropriation, for example, by noting that famed 
composer George Gershwin “borrowed” heavily from African-American cultural 
expression, and was even accused of stealing the piece “I Got Rhythm” from the 
classically trained African-American composer William Grant Still). 
 45. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: 
Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 
986 (2002) (arguing that the framework for moral rights in a creation draws out of the 
artist or author’s infusion of the self into their work). 
 46. See GUNTHER SCHULLER, EARLY JAZZ: ITS ROOTS AND MUSICAL DEVELOPMENT 
179-80 (1968) (articulating that by substituting an unsubtle, rhythmic drive for the 
expressive power and improvisation notable of the best African-American bands of the 
time, the Original Dixieland Jazz Band found the formula for mass appeal). 
 47. See BEN SIDRAN, BLACK TALK: HOW THE MUSIC OF BLACK AMERICA CREATED 
A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE VALUES OF WESTERN LITERARY TRADITION 50-51 
(1971) (noting that the Original Dixieland Band “made the first jazz recordings that 
sold millions of copies”). 
 48. See CHARLES GILLET, THE SOUND OF THE CITY: THE RISE OF ROCK AND ROLL 
189 (Outerbridge & Dienstfrey ed., 1970) (1996) (analyzing the role of race in the 
production of rock-and-roll, and explaining that rhythm and blues hits were 
increasingly recorded by white singers by the late 1950s, losing much of their style and 
substance along the way). 
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author is coded deep within the copyright system.”49  By any measurement, 
the treatment of black artists vis-à-vis white artists is striking in the non-
reciprocal nature of the appropriation, and the imposition of vicious 
dignitary harm to blacks as a group through negative cultural stereotyping. 
C. Blacks and Trademark Law 
At first blush, as Alex Johnson, Jr. has remarked, “the law of trademarks 
would seem to have little to do with issues of race and racial 
identification.”50  Trademark law provides protection to trademark owners 
against unauthorized use of their own or a similar mark, when it is likely to 
lead to consumer confusion.51  On closer examination, however, Johnson 
demonstrated that “the principles of trademark law provide surprising 
insight into the formation of dichotomous racial classifications in the 
United States.”52  Trademark law is inextricably tied to advertising and 
marketing.  As Desiree Kennedy pointed out, advertising “is an important 
means of public discourse . . . [and] . . . is instrumental in affecting 
viewers’ perceptions of their world and their interactions with others.”53  
Further, Lew Gibbons noted, modern trademarks play a large role in 
shaping “individual and group social identity.”54  The history of 
advertising, and the role of trademarks therein, is one rife with stereotypical 
images.55 
                                                          
 49. See Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (2005) (asserting 
that artists and creators have been dependant upon sheer generosity for much of 
recorded history). 
 50. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on 
Insights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 906 (1996) (asserting that 
by providing uniform quality and economizing on consumer search costs, trademark 
law makes implicit assumptions about the identity of the unknown consumer). 
 51. See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible 
Shrinking Confusion Doctrine, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620 (2004) 
(explaining that trademark law prohibits the use of marks similar or identical to 
registered trademarks only when they are used by a potential competitor or producer of 
similar goods or services). 
 52. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 906 (asserting that the principals of trademark 
law, though having seemingly little to do with race, operate in a fashion similar to 
racial identification). 
 53. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of 
Advertising on Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 615-17 (2000) (asserting that advertising is 
highly important in shaping common perceptions of societal norms, roles, and 
hierarchies). 
 54. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and Immoral and 
the Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 196 (2005) (rejecting a law and economics approach to 
“queer” marks and re-appropriation of negatively stereotyping trademarks by outsider 
groups such as gays and minorities). 
 55. See Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-based 
Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 347-49 (2003) (listing various 
examples of overtly racist advertisements, such as those that stated they would only be 
10
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Trademarks used in advertising can impact more than just commercial 
transactions; media images “are frequently the predominant source of 
information many have about people of color.”56  In the same way that 
“coon” music in early America reflected derogatory anti-black stereotypes, 
so did trade symbols used to sell products. Historically, trademarks and 
symbols almost perfectly replicated cultural stereotypes about black men 
and women.  From Sambo and Ratus, the grinning chef on the box of 
Cream of Wheat cereal, to Uncle Ben and Aunt Jemima, trademark law 
essentially legalized and promoted the use of stereotypical representations 
of blacks and other minorities.  Additionally, it has been said that 
“twentieth century white identity was forged in the crucible of Jim Crow 
iconography, including Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and blackface 
minstrels.”57  These idyllic southern stereotypes of the smiling, happy black 
domestic servant could be seen as “myths [that] masked the ugly violence 
of lynching, disenfranchisement and segregation.”58 
In the case of black men, history shows the durability of three stock 
prototypes: the “Tom” character, the “Coon” character, and the “Buck” 
character.59  “The Tom caricature portrays Black men as faithful, happy, 
submissive servants.”60  An example of this in trademark law is Uncle Ben, 
the elderly black man used to sell rice.  He is comforting, non-threatening, 
de-sexualized, and there to serve whites. 
The Coon character, in contrast, is lazy, shiftless, and unintelligent, yet 
cunning in obtaining vices he enjoys.61  Amos ‘n’ Andy, examples of Coon 
characters, were characters created for a radio show in 1928 that went on to 
“become one the country’s most popular radio programs.”62  The characters 
were black, but initially played by whites—the show’s creators—on the 
                                                          
sold to whites, to advertisements based on racial stereotypes, such as Crazy Horse Malt 
Liquor). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Arela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and 
Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 675 (2001) (asserting that these stereotypes were 
born in part out of whites’ efforts to keep newly freed slaves “in their place”). 
 58. See id. (noting, in addition, that the increasing violence of male white 
supremacists was compounded by the growing assertiveness of white women). 
 59. See generally DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES & 
BUCKS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS (Viking Press 
1973). 
 60. David Pilgrim, The Caricatures - Golliwoggz!, Dec. 2000, 
http://golliwogg.wordpress.com/the-caricatures (explaining that the Tom caricature 
endeared himself to whites by being dependable, selfless, and psychologically 
dependent on whites for approval). 
 61. See id. (noting that the Coon character was the most insulting of the anti-black 
caricatures, portraying blacks as lazy, stupid, childish, and morally wanting). 
 62. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing whether, 
after over twenty years of disuse, CBS effectively had abandoned copyright ownership 
of the Amos ‘n’ Andy characters and series). 
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radio, who posed in blackface for publicity photos.  When the show went to 
television in 1951, black actors took over in the lead roles.  Amos ‘n’ Andy 
was protected by both copyright and trademark.  In the 1980s trademark 
litigation ensued over whether CBS, which had discontinued the show in 
the 1960s after protests by civil rights advocates, abandoned and therefore 
lost legal rights in the Amos ‘n’ Andy mark.63 
Similarly, Sambo’s Restaurants used the symbol of a smiling Coon-type 
character to sell food products for over sixty years.  “Little Black Sambo” 
was a literary character that “has long been a part of the American culture,” 
dating back to a 1781 play “where the black male Sambo character, played 
by a white actor in blackface, ‘danced, sang, spoke nonsense, and acted the 
buffoon.’”64  After numerous complaints from civil rights activists and 
lawsuits by municipalities seeking to prevent expansion, Sambo’s 
Restaurants changed its name to “Sam’s” in 1989.65 
The Buck character is a brute, and could represent the worst fears of 
early white America—that of the hyper-sexual black male intent on getting 
access to white women’s sexuality.66  The Buck character surfaces in 
political marketing, a fairly recent incarnation, being the “infamous 
television spot from the 1988 presidential campaign” of George Bush, Sr., 
featuring released criminal Willie Horton.67 
Stereotypes with roots in trademarks have stigmatized African-American 
women.  It has been noted that “American history is replete with ‘slave-
rooted’ images of African-American womanhood.”68  Three negative 
stereotypes exist regarding black women: the “Aunt Jemima” type, a 
domestic servant; the “Mammy” type, a typically domineering, matriarchal 
                                                          
 63. See id. at 51 (finding that CBS still held rights to the post-1948 radio scripts, 
but that those prior were in the public domain). 
 64. See Ronald Turner, “Little Black Sambo,” Images and Perceptions: Professor 
Cohen’s Critique of Professor Lawrence, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 131, 140 
(1995). 
 65. See, e.g., Sambo’s Restaurants Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 695 
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the name “Sambo,” while offensive to blacks, was 
commercial speech protected under the First Amendment). 
 66. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying 
(Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 437-38 (2006) (noting 
that the brute caricature served to legitimize slavery and Jim Crow by providing a 
compelling case for segregation and the suppression of black men to protect white 
women). 
 67. See, e.g., Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1487 
(2001) (asserting that Republicans’ motivations in choosing Horton were influenced by 
the fact that his crime was particularly frightening to many of their constituency—that 
of a black male raping a white woman). 
 68. See, e.g., Lori A. Tribbett-Williams, Saying Nothing, Talking Loud: Lil’ Kim 
and Foxy Brown, Caricatures of African-American Womanhood, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 167, 169-70 (2000). 
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figure; and the “Jezebel” type, a highly amoral, sexualized representation.69 
Trademark law derives its authority at the federal level from the Lanham 
Act of 1946.  The Lanham Act prohibits the trademarked use of racially 
derogatory images, but limits the trademark registration of such images 
under Section Two, part of which prohibits the registration of a mark that 
consists of or comprises “scandalous” or “immoral” matter.70  Further, 
trademark law prohibits the registration of trademarks that may 
disparage—i.e., bring into contempt or disrepute—living or dead persons, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.71  In recent years, groups 
including Native Americans and African-Americans used Section Two of 
the Lanham Act to cancel the registration of racially offensive trademarks. 
In today’s marketplace, scholars note that “explicit racial discrimination 
is rare in commercial advertising,” but subtle forms of stereotyping still 
persist.72  Professor Rosemary Coombe has noted that stereotypes of Native 
Americans in advertising are particularly entrenched.73  African-American 
trademarks, however, such as Uncle Ben and Aunt Jemima have received 
makeovers in recent years to remove stereotypical associations.  Despite 
commercial changes, racist groups on the internet still use stereotypical 
commentary to link blacks to consumption of Kentucky Fried Chicken.  
Some blacks have even attempted to trademark derogatory terms such as 
“nigga.”74 
One of the ironies of minstrelsy, which inculcated stereotypes that persist 
to this day, was that it provided the first opportunities for black artists and 
performers, especially black women.75  Black women from slavery until 
well into the twentieth century were characterized in popular culture and 
                                                          
 69. See id. (describing the fourth stereotype, the “tragic mulatto,” as being of two 
races and accepted by neither); see also PATRICIA MORTON, DISFIGURED IMAGES: THE 
HISTORICAL ASSAULT ON AFRO-AMERICAN WOMEN xi, xiv (1991). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000); Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the 
Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous or Immoral Trademarks, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 661, 663 (1993). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000); Baird, supra note 70, at 730-31. 
 72. See Petty et al., supra note 55, at 348 (noting that “implied and inferential 
racial messages” persist). 
 73. See Rosemary Coombe, Marking Difference in American Commerce: 
Trademarks and Alertity at Century’s End, 19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 
105, 111 (1996) (remarking on the persistence of negative stereotyping in advertising 
of such brands as RED MAN tobacco, BRAVES, and REDSKINS for sports teams, 
among others). 
 74. See Brenda Porter, ‘N’ Word Means Divide and Conquer, BLACK ENTERPRISE, 
May 1, 2007 (recounting the failed attempt by comedian Damon Wayans to patent the 
word “nigga” for a clothing line and remarking that the website “niggaspace.com” is an 
online social website for African-Americans). 
 75. See ROSALYN M. SCOTT, AND SO I SING: AFRICAN-AMERICAN DIVAS OF OPERA 
AND CONCERT 14-15 (1990) (noting that African-Americans gained theatrical 
experience and financial advantages through minstrelsy). 
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literature “by the stereotypical images of [either] the ham-fisted matriarch 
[or] the amoral, instinctual slut.”76  The “unifying theme underlying 
[stereotypes of black women] is one of deviance and worthlessness . . . .”77  
Media defined black women as Mammies, Jezebels, Aunt Jemimas, 
Sapphires, and welfare queens.78 
II. THE EMERGING FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF INTELLECUAL PROPERTY 
The impact of both gender and race in IP has been under-explored until 
recent years.  IP scholars such as Dan Burk have noted the rarity of 
“[f]ocused critical examination of pervasive biases of the intellectual 
property system . . . .”79  The feminist critique of IP is still in its early 
stages, but it provides a good foundation for the analysis of the ways that a 
seemingly “gender-neutral” regime, such as IP, can in fact reinforce social 
domination.  IP, in the form of film, theatre, music, and literature provides 
the raw material for popular culture, and feminist scholars such as Susan 
Bisom-Rap have noted that “[p]opular culture is a fertile analytical site for 
feminist legal theory.”80 
A great strength of feminist legal theory is its focus on uncovering 
subordination hidden in “neutral” legal regulations.81  Professor Coombe, 
for example, has recognized that “[i]ntellectual property law does not 
function simply in a rule-like fashion, nor is it merely a regime of rights 
and obligations.”82  Rather, it exists in a cultural battleground of hegemony, 
social dominance, and resistance.  A feminist critique recognizes that rights 
governing cultural production did not arise in a social or cultural vacuum, 
but in a crucible of gender and racial subordination, the embers of which 
                                                          
 76. See Sherely Anne Williams, Foreword to ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES 
WERE WATCHING GOD, at vii (Univ. of Ill. Press 1978) (1937). 
 77. See Margaret M. Russell, Law and Racial Legal Reelism: Black Women as 
Celluloid “Legal” Heroines, in MARTHA A. FINEMAN & MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEY, 
FEMINISM, MEDIA AND THE LAW 136 (1997). 
 78. See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial 
Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1049-50 (describing the effect of these caricatures 
as marginalizing African-American women). 
 79. See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 186 (2007) (noting that patterns of subordination in 
women’s work “appear to hold true in our system for rewarding innovation and 
creativity”). 
 80. See Susan Bisom-Rap, Introduction to MARTHA A. FINEMAN & MARTHA T. 
MCCLUSKEY, FEMINISM, MEDIA AND THE LAW 87, 89 (1997) (noting that feminists seek 
to gain greater influence over the gender messages deployed in popular culture). 
 81. See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A 
PRIMER 45-56 (2006) (noting that legal feminist methodology focuses on uncovering 
“male biases hidden beneath supposedly ‘neutral’ laws”). 
 82. Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463, 
481 (1998). 
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still burn today.  Authorship, after all “is the foundation of copyright,”83 
and authorship, like race and gender, is socially constructed. 
Some analytical commonalities exist between feminist critiques of IP 
and those that seek to expose racial subordination in the IP context.  This 
Article seeks to illustrate that there is an invisible—in an Ellsonian sense—
dynamic of subordination that underlies the “race-neutral” regime of IP.  In 
a similar vein, IP scholars using a feminist paradigm have noted that 
“intellectual property appears to have been largely overlooked in feminist 
critiques of the law . . . .”84  Similarly, feminist scholars have recognized 
that IP scholarship, in the words of Sonia Katyal, has traditionally “failed 
to consider how intellectual property, as it is owned, constituted, created, 
and enforced, both benefits and disadvantages segments of the population 
in divergent ways.”85 
Gender perspectives on IP can help inform issues of race and reform, and 
vice versa.  Racial critiques of IP, like feminist critiques, can provide 
“insight into the power, social structures, and theory that would otherwise 
be missing . . . [and can] give[] us a different way of looking at the 
world.”86  Feminist IP scholars have noted that copyright laws from their 
inception 
were written by men to embody a male vision of the ways in which 
creativity and commerce should intersect . . . [w]hether this model of 
copyright serves women as well as men has not been a primary 
consideration of policy makers, if it has even been contemplated at all.87 
Similarly, scholars such as Rebecca Tushnet, examining IP through the 
lens of gender, have noted that “when we compare fields that get 
intellectual property protection (software, sculpture) with fields that do not 
(fashion, cooking, sewing) it becomes uncomfortably obvious that our 
cultural policy has expected women’s  endeavors to generate surplus 
creativity but has assumed that men’s endeavors require 
compensation . . . .”88 
                                                          
 83. Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for 
Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 209 (2007). 
 84. Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 521 (2006). 
 85. Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property and the Slashing of Gender in Fan 
Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 462 (2006). 
 86. See Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 432 (2006) (“[T]he issue of copyright has not been 
considered a feminist issue . . . .”). 
 87. Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright 
Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 557 (2006). 
 88. Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 303-04 (2007). 
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A. African-American Women and IP 
Throughout U.S. history, black women have borne the unique burden of 
being subordinated based on both race and gender.89  Intersectionality 
theory, an off-shoot of critical race feminism, posits that “black women are 
subordinated in ways not predicted by the lowest common denominator 
experiences of just blacks or just women.”90 Critical race feminists “have 
highlighted the failure of mainstream civil rights and feminist paradigms 
alike to see the intersection of racism and sexism in hierarchies of power 
and in the experiences of women of color.”91  Scholars examining race 
through a critical race feminist lens contend that “[b]lack women 
experience a special kind of oppression . . . because of their dual racial and 
gender identity and their limited access to economic resources . . . .”92  For 
example, an examination of black women involved in the criminal justice 
system in late eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries shows that 
black women had higher arrest rates, received longer sentences, and were 
“less likely to be pardoned, paroled or put on probation than were [white] 
females.”93  However, black feminist scholars also note that African-
American women and other women of color are multi-dimensional and 
have “some race issues in common with men of color, some gender issues 
in common with white females, and some separate issues and identities.”94 
Catherine MacKinnon, a leading feminist scholar, contended that 
“women have a history [and] . . . create culture . . . .”95  In the case of black 
women, the contributions to art and culture have been titanic.  African-
                                                          
 89. Cf. Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: 
Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 181 
(1997) (remarking on the dual subordination faced by other women of color such as 
Asian women and positing a theory of “racialized (hetero)sexual harassment” regarding 
Asian women). 
 90. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, 
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 856, 
861 (2006) (postulating that women of color are “denigrated within more than one 
major system of oppression”). 
 91. Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 65. 
 92. Jewel Amoah, Narrative: The Road to Black Feminist Theory, 12 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 84, 99 (1997); see BEVERLY GUY-SHEFTALL, INTRODUCTION TO WORDS 
OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 2 (Beverly Guy-
Sheftall ed., 1995). 
 93. See, e.g., Anne M. Butler, Still in Chains: Black Women in Western Prisons, 
1865-1910, in MONROE LEE BILLINGTON & ROGER D. HARDAWAY, AFRICAN-
AMERICANS ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER 191-92 (1998). 
 94. Angela Mae Kupenda, For White Women: Your Blues Ain’t Like Mine, but We 
All Hide Our Faces and Cry–Literary Illumination for White and Black Sister/Friends, 
22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 71 (2002). 
 95. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 39 (1987) (positing that women “not only have been excluded from making what 
has been considered art; our artifacts have been excluded from setting the standards by 
which art is art”). 
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American women in essence launched the modern recording industry with 
the advent of blues.  A singer named Mamie Smith recorded a song in 1920 
that sold 75,000 copies in one month and one million copies within one 
year.96  Music historians recognize that “the early 1920’s was the golden 
era of the black female blues singer.”97 
Scholars note that “the great classic blues singers were women.”98  More 
than three-quarters of formal blues were “written from a woman’s point of 
view.”99  Thus it was women blues singers and their lyrics “who first 
brought blues into general notice in the United States.”100  History shows 
that the great blues singers, such as Bessie Smith and Ma Rainey, were 
swindled out of copyrights to compositions and subject to disparate 
treatment in segregated “race record” divisions of major record 
companies.101  Bessie Smith, recognized as the greatest of blues singers, 
sold close to ten million records over the course of her career, but was 
duped of copyrights in compositions and royalties for record sales by 
record industry executives and managers.102  Similarly, Ma Rainey, who 
composed most of the songs she recorded, “like most black musicians . . . 
was paid a flat fee for recording sessions, and she never received royalties” 
for copyrighted compositions.103  Yet after the great blues singers of the 
early 1920s, black women virtually disappeared from sight in the 
emergence of ragtime and jazz, genres dominated by men, to such an 
extreme that books on the history of jazz overlook women artists, save 
perhaps references to Billy Holiday and Ella Fitzgerald.104 
                                                          
 96. See TED GIOIA, THE HISTORY OF JAZZ 17 (1997) (noting that “[i]n 1926 alone, 
more than three hundred blues and gospel recordings were released . . . most of them 
featuring black female vocalists”). 
 97. EILEEN SOUTHERN, THE MUSIC OF BLACK AMERICANS: A HISTORY 371 (3d ed. 
1997). 
 98. LEROI JONES, BLUES PEOPLE: THE NEGRO EXPERIENCE IN WHITE AMERICA AND 
THE MUSIC THAT DEVELOPED FROM IT 91 (1963). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. (noting that the majority of country blues singers were almost all men). 
 101. See Greene, supra note 29 (explaining that in 1979, Bessie Smith’s heirs 
unsuccessfully filed suit against Columbia records alleging that Columbia paid Smith a 
flat-fee per song basis with no record royalties, and registered Smith’s compositions in 
the record company’s name, thus denying Smith her copyright royalties). 
 102. See, e.g., AFRICAN-AMERICAN LIVES 779 (Henry Louis Gates & Evelyn Brooks 
Higginbotham eds., 2004) (commenting that in 1931 Columbia Records dropped 
Bessie Smith as an artist and her record sales dramatically declined). 
 103. See BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 959-60 
(Darlene Clark ed., 1993). 
 104. See, e.g., ROY CARR, A CENTURY OF JAZZ: FROM BLUES TO BOB, SWING, AND 
HIP-Hop (1997). 
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III. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
“Critical” perspectives in the context of international IP law are now 
emerging.105  Taking up the challenge to apply the lens of critical race and 
other “critical theories,”106 scholars such as Margaret Chon contend that 
globalization and the gap between rich and developing nations of the 
former colonial period in conjunction with IP have “injected human rights 
and social justice debate into a field dominated by commercial 
instrumentalism and economic rationales . . . .”107  The debate over 
traditional knowledge reflects tensions between the developed world and 
the Third World over culture and control of resources.108  Scholars such as 
Peter Yu explore the connection between IP and human rights.109  Angela 
Riley urges making distinctions between IP rights that further the interest 
of a mere few but dominant entities, for example the Walt Disney 
Corporation, “and those that are designed to put indigenous peoples on 
equal footing with other actors in the global market.”110 
The debate over traditional knowledge, indigenous peoples and IP 
appropriation can provide insight into the dynamic of African-American 
cultural appropriation.  While African-Americans are not an “indigenous” 
people to North America, many commonalties exist between the treatment 
of early blues artists and native peoples.111  In the area of traditional 
                                                          
 105. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal 
Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 392 
(2001) (examining the international legal regime through the lens of critical 
jurisprudence and arguing that facets of international norms and rules marginalize and 
subordinate countless groups of people). 
 106. See Penelope E. Andrews, Making Room for Critical Race Theory in 
International Law: Some Practical Pointers, 45 VILL. L. REV. 855, 872-75 (2000) 
(arguing that two dominant features of critical race theory are the narratives of 
individuals and its lack of programs). 
 107. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2825 (2006) (indicating that analysis of the intersection of 
intellectual property and development is absent larger guiding principles that address 
the central concerns of development). 
 108. See Ghosh, supra note  25, at 76 (highlighting the difference between the 
traditional knowledge debate and debates over the expansion of intellectual property in 
the areas of academic culture and the internet). 
 109. See Peter K. Yu, International Rights Approaches to Intellectual Property: 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests In a Human Rights Framework, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007) (proposing that protecting human rights obligations is 
more important than the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protections). 
 110. See Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and Emerging Protections for 
Traditional Knowledge, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: 
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 373, 383 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) 
(indicating that balanced and fair protection of TK will not provide indigenous groups 
with additional rights, but instead put them on the same level as other creators). 
 111. See David E. Wilkins, African Americans and Aboriginal Peoples: Similarities 
and Differences in Historical Experiences, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 515, 530 (2005) 
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knowledge (“TK”), asymmetries of power between the developed and the 
colonial or developing world in the nineteenth century “led to certain types 
of knowledge that were concentrated in the Third World as essentially 
being deemed public domain resources that were freely appropriable.”112  
Although no single definition of TK exists, it has been described as 
“indigenous and local community knowledge, innovations, and 
practices . . . often collectively owned and transmitted orally from 
generation to generation.”113  As Paul Kuruk has noted, the group-focused, 
collective nature of TK makes it difficult to protect under traditional IP law 
norms.114 
Christine Haight Farley was one of the first scholars to analyze the 
disadvantages IP imposed on traditional knowledge and indigenous 
peoples.115  Professor Farley noted that indigenous people in recent decades 
have attempted to use IP law “to protect their cultural heritage from 
external poaching.”116  Traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, like 
the works of early black blues artists, has presented challenges to IP 
protection, and often for the same reasons. 
                                                          
(exploring similarities between indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans and 
African-Americans, and noting that both Native Americans and blacks historically have 
endured a similar lack of rights, even though the law has treated each group quite 
differently); see also Howard J. Vogel, Reframing Rights from the Ground Up: The 
Contribution of the New U.N. Law of Self-Determination to Recovering the Principle of 
Sociability on the Way to a Relational Theory of International Human Rights, 20 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 443, 459 (2006) (contending that African-Americans may qualify 
as a “minority people” under international human rights law). 
 112. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 209 (1998) (noting that 
western categories of intellectual property “divide peoples and things according to the 
same colonizing discourses of  possessive individualism that historically disentitled and 
disenfranchised Native peoples in North America”); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS 
and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global 
Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 163 (2006) 
(explaining that the global intellectual property system that developed at the end of the 
nineteenth century was based on existing national intellectual property systems and 
bilateral agreements between countries). 
 113. See, e.g., Bryan Bachner, Facing the Music: Traditional Knowledge and 
Copyright, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 9 (2005) (noting that TK can include forms of 
stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, cultural values, rituals, local languages, agricultural 
practices, and medical resources). 
 114. See Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis Frameworks 
of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 67, 72 (2007) (stating that another problem with IP laws and 
indigenous knowledge is IP laws only offer protection for fixed periods of time and not 
an indeterminate period necessary to protect indigenous knowledge). 
 115. See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is 
Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (concluding that the 
current IP system is well-suited for those who want to disseminate their art, but not for 
those who want to prevent outside use of their art). 
 116. See id. at 13 (claiming that indigenous groups want control over their art so that 
they can use mass media imagery to communicate their cultural identity to the outside 
world). 
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As Professor Farley noted, the fixation requirement of copyright, for 
example, can constitute a barrier to protection because folklore and 
traditional knowledge “may never be recorded in any tangible form.”117  
Traditional knowledge, such as folklore, has existed “beyond the reach of 
conventional IP models of ownership and moral rights.”118 Daniel Gervais 
has provided three main areas in which IP has been incompatible with TK 
protection.119  One, TK has been under-protected because it is too old and 
therefore in the public domain.120  Two, TK does not qualify for IP 
protection because the author of the material cannot be identified.121  Three, 
TK is often created by large, diffused groups, whereas western IP 
paradigms are based on creation by individuals.122  In contrast, aboriginal 
or indigenous cultures seek to protect cultural resources “in the name of the 
relevant community.”123 
Analysts in the TK arena assert that the cultural appropriation of 
indigenous people’s works “causes cultural devastation” and reinforces 
systems of subordination used to oppress native groups.124  The harm of 
appropriation in the TK context is exacerbated “because of the spiritual or 
sacred element in much indigenous, creative material.”125 
Just as blues men and women found their musical works routinely 
appropriated, a similar dynamic impacted native peoples.  The most famous 
example is the song “The Lion Sleeps Tonight,” derived from the 
composition of a Zulu tribesman, who sold the rights for a pittance.126  The 
                                                          
 117. See id. at 28-29 (explaining that film-makers and researchers who fix an 
indigenous work in a tangible medium are not the authors of that work and therefore 
not the original copyright owners). 
 118. See Johanna Gibson, Intellectual Property Systems, Traditional Knowledge, 
and the Legal Authority of Community, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 280, 287 (2004). 
 119. See Daniel J. Gervais, Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New 
Challenges From the Very Old and Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 929, 957-58 (2002). 
 120. See id. (arguing that traditionally intellectual property rights are awarded for a 
limited period before they return to the public domain for others to use). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. (explaining that the works such as textile patterns, musical rhythms, and 
dances may have several versions or incarnations). 
 123. See Gibson, supra note 118, at 287. 
 124. See Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of 
Intellectual Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 78 (2005) (indicating that the 
destruction of the rain forest in Brazil has destroyed indigenous inhabitants’ language, 
religion, and cultural existence). 
 125. See Nancy Kremers, Speaking with Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on 
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 108 n.619 (2004) (noting that subtle 
linguistic and conceptual distinctions could help indicate whether Western laws are 
suitable for protecting traditional knowledge). 
 126. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 24, at 263 (noting that the author of the song, 
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song went on to become a massive hit, subsequently used in the Disney 
movie “The Lion King.”127  Similarly, a Taiwanese tribal people known as 
the Ami found their traditional folk songs recorded without compensation 
and used by the artist Enigma.128  As in the case of blues artists, it is 
“abundantly clear that intellectual property regimes fail to adequately 
capture all of the cultural and economic significance” of the works of 
indigenous peoples.129 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Taken together, critical race, feminist, and internationalist critiques of IP 
have the potential to transform the way we think of IP rights and 
protection.  IP itself is in a period of analytical and practical turbulence, 
and a focus on critical perspectives can be invaluable to re-imagining an IP 
system that actually provides real incentives to artists at the bottom of 
society, rather than multi-national conglomerates concentrated across IP 
industries. 
The critical project of IP examination can provide ways to achieve racial 
and gender equality, rather than reinforcing unequal social constructs 
through the dynamics of IP protection.  Critical perspectives locate IP in a 
social construct, just as race and gender are socially constructed.130  
Therefore, IP can be re-engineered to bring about results of distributive 
justice and to foster norms of racial and gender equality.  These results 
would be in keeping with the constitutional mandate of IP protection, 
which is designed to insure a robust marketplace of ideas, and to 
compensate those who add intellectual, scientific, and artistic value to 
society.  Further, a critical examination of IP rights is consistent with a 
human rights perspective of IP being developed by scholars using 
international norms to inform IP entitlements. 
 
                                                          
Solomon Linda, died in 1962 “with less than $25.00 to his name”). 
 127. See id. (indicating that Linda assigned the rights to the publisher during the 
apartheid-era for less than two dollars). 
 128. See Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An 
Essay on Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 158-59 (2004) 
(claiming that the Lifvon and other Ami tribal members performed their aboriginal 
music across Europe in the mid-1990s and were recorded and published without their 
knowledge). 
 129. See id. at 159 (claiming that international law will not come any closer to 
protecting indigenous work than already exists because the Western model of 
intellectual property is becoming dominant). 
 130. See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social 
Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 
67 (2003) (believing that critical education reminds members of social groups that “law 
and society are a constructed, not given, inheritance”). 
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